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STUDENT NOTES
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATIONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The statute creating the State Water Commission provided
for a review by certiorari in the circuit court with an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Appeals.' It also authorized the circuit
court to hear evidence and make such order as the whole matter
demanded. The commission ordered the city of Princeton to in-
stall a certain sewage plant or stop dumping its sewage into
Brush Creek- The Supreme Court of Appeals held the statute
unconstitutional as an attempt to delegate legislative functions
to the judiciary. Danielley v. City of Princeton.!
The doctrine of separation of powers is merely a practical
device for the division of labor.' All governmental powers are
1W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 5.
2167 S. E. 620 (W. Va., 1933).
5 Pound, Spurious Interpretation (1907) 7 COL. L. REv. 379, 384. No
one will assert at present that separation of powers is part of the legal
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not essentially legislative, executive or judicial. They necessarily
overlap to some extent.' Even in West Virginia, which has gone
further than most states in placing a rigid doctrine of separation
of powers in its constitution,' the senate approves or disapproves
appointments by the governor; the governor suggests legislation
and may veto enactments at pleasure; the legislature acts judicial-
ly in impeachment cases; courts construe legislation, declare some
of it unconstitutional, and even legislate by their decisions; ad-
ministrative bodies perform functions partaking of legislative,
executive and judicial characteristics. No perfect test has been
found to determine what acts are legislative and what are judicial.'
order of nature or that it is essential to liberty. We recognize today that
it is a practical device existing for practical ends; that it is only the princi-
ple of division of labor applied to government, and that it exists in modern
states as a mere specialization for the reason that any function will be bet-
ter fulfilled by a special organ than by one charged with many functions.
'Ex 1Parte Grossman, 260 U. S. 87, 119, 45 S. Ct. 332, 336 .(1924). The
federal constitution nowhere expressly declares that the three branches of the
government shall be kept separate and independent. Complete inde-
pendence and separation between the three branches, however, are not at-
tained, or intended, as other provisions of the constitution and the normal
operation of the government under it easily demonstrate. Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U. S. 71, 23 S. Ct. 28 (1902). The three great powers of government
need not be entirely segrated. There is some necessary overlapping. But
all the functions of one department cannot be delegated to another.
1W. Va. Const., art. 5. "The legislative, executive, and judicial depart-
ments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise powers
properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the
powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of
the peace shall be eligible to the legislature."
G Searle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226 N. W. 464 (1929). (Passing upon
the propriety of incorporating a light, heat, and power district is a legisla-
tive function which cannot be delegated to the courts). Barnes v. Minor,
80 Neb. 189, 114 N. V. 146 (1907). (Incorporating a drainage district and
deciding what lands could be excluded as not being benefited by it is a
proper judicial function). Funkhouser v. Randolph, 287 Il1. 94, 122 N. E.
144 (1919). (Whether a special drainage district should be organized and
what lands should be included in it is a legislative function which cannot
be delegated to the court). Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb. 520,
118 N. W. 127 (1908). (Deciding on the propriety of cutting out a tract
of land from a city corporation is a proper judicial function). Tyson v.
Washington County, 78 Neb. 211, 110 N. W. 634 (1907). (Whether a drain-
age ditch will be conducive to the public health, convenience, or welfare, or
whether the route is practical are questions of governmental or administrative
policy which cannot be delegated to the courts). West Virginia has several
cases holding that the circuit courts may act administratively or as sub-
sidiaries of the legislature in reviewing assessments of property, incorpor-
ating towns, settling boundary disputes, and in other similar instances.
Ritchie County Bank v. County Court, 65 W. Va. 208, 63 S. E. 1098 (1909);
Bluefield Water Works Co. v. State, 63 W. Va. 480, 60 S. E. 403 (1908);
Summers County v. Monroe County, 43 W. Va. 207, 27 S. E. 307 (1897);
State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896); In re Town
of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894); Mackin v. Taylor
County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S. E. 632 (1893); Railway Co. v. Board of
Public Works, 28 W. Va. 264 (1886).
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Courts have held the same act to be both.: The test Mr. Justice
Holmes laid down in the Prentis case,8 while far from perfect, is
the one most frequently quoted:
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts, and under
existing laws, while legislation looks to the future and changes
conditions, making new rules to be thereafter applied."
By this test, rate making is a legislative function, but in Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, the court said due pro-
cess requires a complete judicial review on the facts as well as
the law where confiscation is charged. It would seem that the
water commission statute went no further than due process re-
quires according to the Ben Avon case. The task, on review, was
about the same in each instance. The validity of a rate depends
entirely upon the facts of the particular case. Only because
courts have long been passing upon the reasonableness and un-
reasonableness of rates do they feel qualified to do so. Their
qualifications in rate cases probably are no greater than in stream
pollution cases. Each decision calls for expert knowledge and
judgment in a field where courts ordinarily have no special train-
ing. Complete judicial review is of doubtful value in either case.
Since the doctrine in the Ben Avon case is questionable even
when confined to rate making, ° it should not be extended further
than its own facts demand. That seems to be the tendency,' al-
7Ih re Davis, 168 N. Y. 89, 61 N. E. 118 (1901) (Statute required the
supreme court justices to hold hearings and obtain evidence to be used by
the attorney general in prosecutions under the anti-trust act. It was held
these were judicial duties because they were incidental to a judicial pro-
ceeding.) In the Matter of Richardson, 247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655 (1928).
(Statute required the justices of the supreme court to hold hearings to obtain
evidence to be used in disqualifying public officers. Judge Cardozo said this
was an executive function Which could not be imposed on the courts or on
the judges.)
'Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908).
Enabling and validating legislation is usually based on present or past facts.
By their decisions, courts actually lay down rules for the future. To the
effect that rate making is a legislative act, see Reagan v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 S. Ct. 104 (1893).
9 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527 (1920). Accord Bluefield Water Works Co.
v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 679, 43 S. Ct. 675 (1923); Laidlow v.
Abraham, 43 Fed. 297 (C. C. D. Ore., 1890); Duluth v. Railroad and Ware-
house Comm., 167 Minn. 311, 209 N. W. 10 (1926).
"0 See the dissenting opinions of Justice Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke in
the Ben Avon case, supra n. 8.
2Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445 (1923).
Mr. Chief Justice Taft held void the part of an act of Congress which at-
tempted to give the Supreme Court of the United States revisory powers
over rates in the District of Columbia. Due process does not require a
judicial-review of a medical board's determination on the qualification of a
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though Mr. Chief Justice Hughes did go so far recently as to say
that due process requires a trial de novo as to the existence of the
jurisdictional facts upon which the commission acted.' But it is
not clear that due process need' require more than a review to
determine the existence of a full and fair hearing, the good faith
of the commission, and the existence of substantial evidence.?
Yet a statute should not be held unconstitutional if it can be
saved at all." In the Danielley case, the court may have felt that
it was bound by the decision in Hodges v. Public Service Commis-
sion.? In the latter case, which was concerned with the adminis-
tration of the water power act, the commission was required to
weigh the interests of the state before granting or refusing a
license for power development. That probably came a little nearer
being pure legislative action, if there can be such a thing, than
either rate making or remedying stream pollution.'7 The statute
clearly required a review de novo by the court.
The water commission act, under consideration in the Danielley
case, was apparently capable of two constructions. The provision
for certiorari was inconsistent with that for taking further evi-
dence in the circuit court. It is suggested the latter provision
might have been held void. In United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission's the statute authorized an appeal to the su-
preme court from the findings of the commission, with the provi-
physician. See Reitz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 23 S. Ct. 390 (1903); People
v. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah .291, 39 Pac. 918 (1895); Albert v. General Council
of Medical Education and Registration, 23 Q. B. D. 400 (1889). See gen-
erally, Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 U. S.
541, 32 S. Ct. 108 (1911); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 S.
Ct. 201 (1907); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 S. Ct. 644 (1905);
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 S. Ct. 789 (1904).
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1931). See the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the same ease and cases there cited.
"Local Government Board v. Arlidge, (1915) H. L., A. C. 120; Kwock
Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 40 S. Ct. 566 (1920); Bates & Guild Co.
v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24 S. Ct. 595 (1904); Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 64 Colo. 229, 171 Pac. 74 (1918); Provident Life Assurance
Society v. Cutting, 181 Mass. 261, 63 N. E. 433 (1902).
"'United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Servine Comm., 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E.
931 (1914).
"110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).
10W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9.
17Fall v. Sutton, 21 Cal. 237 (1862). The question of what the public
convenience requires is a political and not a legal question. Its decision rests
with the legislature and depends upon its discretion, the exercise of which,
in the granting of a subsequent franchise is conclusive and not reviewable by
the courts. See also Searle v. Yensen; Funkhouser v. Randolph; and Tyson
v. Washington Co., all supra n. 5.
8 Supra n. 14.
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sion that the court should decide the matter in controversy as
might seem just and right. The court construed this to provide
only for a writ of prohibition or mandamus. The supreme court
of Indiana recently held a statute, very similar to that in the
Danielley case, to be void only to the extent that it attempted to
require a judicial review of discretionary administrative action."
Merely construing the statute in the Danielley case to provide for
a review only by certiorari would have saved the statute and still
have given adequate judicial review.
-GEORGE W. MCQUAN.
29h're Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 171 N. E. 265 (Ind., 1930).
Accord: Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494 (1915) ; State v. Phillips,
70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367 (1915); Echart v. State, 5 W. Va. 515 (1872).
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